

Philosophy of Mind

Steven DeLay
Christ Church, Oxford

Course Description

This course surveys contemporary philosophy of mind. We will draw on the collective resources of both the analytic and continental traditions. Topics to be examined include: the mind-body problem, the problem of intentionality, phenomenal consciousness, and the question of what exactly a mind is.

Week 1 Introduction: What is the Mind?

Haugeland, J. "The Saga of the Modern Mind", in *Artificial Intelligence: the Very Idea* (MIT, 1989).
Haugeland, J. "The Intentionality All-Stars", *Philosophical Perspectives*, Vol. 4. pp. 383-427, 1990.

Week 2 Phenomenal Consciousness

Nagel, T. 1974. "What is it like to be a bat?", *Philosophical Review*. Reprinted in his *Mortal Questions* and elsewhere.
Siewert, C. 1998. *The Significance of Consciousness*. Princeton University Press.

Week 3 Physicalism

Crane, T. & D. H. Mellor 1990. There is no question of physicalism. *Mind*, 99 (394): 185-206.
Fodor, J. 1974. Special sciences (or: the disunity of science as a working hypothesis). *Synthese*, 28: 97-115. Reprinted in Chalmers 2002.
McGinn, C. 1980. Philosophical materialism, *Synthese*, 44: 173-206. Reprinted in *The Problem of Consciousness* (Blackwell, 1991).
Melnik, A. 1994. Being a physicalist: How and (more importantly) why. *Philosophical Studies*, 74: 221-41.
Montero, B. 2009. What is the physical? In McLaughlin et al. 2009.
Papineau, D. 2001. The rise of physicalism. In C. Gillett and B. Loewer (eds.) *Physicalism and its Discontents*. New York: CUP, pp. 3-36.

Week 4 The Knowledge Argument

Jackson, F. 1982. Epiphenomenal qualia, *Philosophical Quarterly* 32: 127-136. Reprinted in Lycan & Prinz 2008 and Chalmers 2002.
Lewis, D. 2002. What experience teaches. Reprinted in Chalmers 2002 and O'Connor & Robb 2003.

- Loar, B. 1997. Phenomenal states (second version). In Block et al. 1997. Reprinted in Chalmers 2002.
- Ludlow, P., Y. Nagasawa, and D. Stoljar (eds.). 2004. Introduction. In *There's Something About Mary*, MIT Press.
- Perry, J. 2001. *Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Week 5 Type Identity Theories*
- Enç, B. 1983. In defense of the identity theory. *Journal of Philosophy*, 80: 279-298.
- Hill, C. 1991. *Sensations: A Defence of the Identity Theory*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kim, J. 1992. Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 52: 1-26. Reprinted in Chalmers 2002.
- Kripke, S. 1980. Identity and necessity, extract from *Naming and Necessity*. Reprinted in O'Connor & Robb 2003 and Chalmers 2002.

Week 6 Type Identity Theories Cont.

- Lewis, D. 1994. Reduction of Mind. In Guttenplan, S. (ed.) *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford, Blackwell). Reprinted in O'Connor & Robb 2003.
- Place, U.T. 1956. Is consciousness a brain process? *British Journal of Psychology*, 47: 44-50. Reprinted in Chalmers (2002) and Lycan & Prinz 2008.
- Smart, J.J.C. 1962. Sensations and brain processes. In Chalmers (2002).
- Smart, J.J.C. 2004. The identity theory of the mind. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind_identity/

Week 7 Token Identity Theories

- Davidson, D. 1963. Actions, reasons, and causes, *Journal of Philosophy*, 60: 685-700. Reprinted in his *Essays on Actions and Events* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Davidson, D. 1970. Mental events. In L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (eds.), *Experience and Theory*, Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, pp. 79-101. Reprinted in *Reprinted in his Essays on Actions and Events* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Horgan, T. and Tye, M. 1985. Against the token identity theory, in E. LePore and B. McLaughlin (eds.) *Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson*, 408-427.
- Hornsby, J. 1980-1. Which physical events are mental events? *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 81: 73- 92. Reprinted in her (1997) *Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Week 8 Functionalism

- Armstrong, D. The causal theory of the mind. Reprinted in Chalmers 2002 and Lycan & Prinz 2008.
- Jackson, F., Pargetter, R. & Prior, E.W. 1982. Functionalism and type-type identity theories, *Philosophical Studies*, 42/2: 209-225.
- Shoemaker, S. 1975. Functionalism and qualia, *Philosophical Studies*, 27: 291-315. Reprinted in his *Identity, Cause and Mind: Philosophical Essays* (1984).
- Shoemaker, S. 1981. Some varieties of functionalism. *Philosophical Topics*, 12: 83-118. Reprinted in his *Identity, Cause and Mind: Philosophical Essays* (1984).

Putnam, H. The nature of mental states. Reprinted in Lycan & Prinz 2008 and Chalmers 2002.

Week 9 *Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Mind*

Husserl, E. "Philosophy as Rigorous Science."

Week 10 *Phenomenology Cont.*

Crowell, S. "The First-Person Character of Philosophical Knowledge", in *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger* (Cambridge: 2013).

Gallagher S. and Zahavi, D. "Methodologies", in *The Phenomenological Mind* (Routledge, 2012).

Week 11 *Phenomenology Cont.*

Gallagher S. and Zahavi, D. "Intentionality", in *The Phenomenological Mind* (Routledge, 2012).

Gallagher S. and Zahavi, D. "Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Science, and Phenomenology", in *The Phenomenological Mind* (Routledge, 2012).

Week 12 *Phenomenology Cont.*

Crowell, S. "The Normative in Perception", in *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger* (Cambridge: 2013).

Crowell, S. "Husserl's Subjectivism and the Philosophy of Mind", in *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger* (Cambridge: 2013).