

Teaching Portfolio

Steven DeLay

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Teaching Statement

While at Oxford, I taught eleven courses (both tutorials and prelim sections), including offerings on analytic metaphysics and epistemology and early modern philosophy (General Philosophy), nineteenth-century philosophy (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard), twentieth-century phenomenology (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty), aesthetics, and contemporary French phenomenology (Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion).

My teaching style mirrors how I conduct philosophical research. I employ an ecumenical style of posing philosophical questions, because students find it at once challenging and rewarding. For example, in the Skepticism/Knowledge section of my metaphysics and epistemology courses, I not only introduced students to the challenge of skepticism by way of close readings of Descartes's *Meditations* and GE Moore's "Proof of an External World." I then placed the issue of skepticism in further context by explaining how Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* and Heidegger's *Being and Time* attempt to undermine, in their own way, the problem of external world skepticism as it has been traditionally understood. As a result, my students not only learn about the longstanding, important dispute between the Cartesian skeptic and the Moorean believer; they are also exposed to views according to which the very idea that the existence of the so-called "external world" requires a proof is just as dubious as the skeptic's own assertion that such a demonstration is unconvincing.

University XYZ gives students personal attention that refines their critical thinking and deepens one's understanding of life's dimensions that encourages students to philosophize for themselves. I understand the importance of that approach, because I received similar instruction as an undergraduate at Cal Poly; without it, I would not have been prepared to carry on my studies. Today, as a teacher, I offer that same kind of instruction to my students. In tutorial teaching at Oxford, I meet with students in small groups to discuss their weekly reading assignments, which they address in an essay. I tailor the weekly readings to the individual research interests of the students, and help them refine their own philosophical views and general writing and critical thinking skills.

For instance, last term I supervised an undergraduate thesis in phenomenology and aesthetics for a student who was preparing to enter an art history master's program. I put together a reading list that specifically addressed her interests, by surveying recent work in contemporary French phenomenology by Jean-Luc Marion and Michel Henry, while also covering the classic phenomenological writings on art by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Though this particular tutorial focused on figures that happen to be central to my research, this approach to teaching is something generalizable. I am thus able and willing to conduct independent studies with students who want to dig into a specific issue or prepare themselves for graduate studies, as many of my students have gone on to graduate studies in a variety of subjects, including philosophy, theology, and art history.

Because my students have gone on to do extremely well on their examinations, often receiving "Firsts," I was frequently invited to teach. In July 2016, for instance, I was invited by the CBL International Oxford & Cambridge Summary Academy to teach their PPE tutorials. I introduced students to the philosophical classics of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Mill, Kant, and Kierkegaard, while also covering elementary formal logic. The first session consisted of thirty students, and the second session consisted of fifteen students, so I am accustomed to teaching standard-sized classes in addition to the tutorial model.

I have included three student testimonials that testify to the individualized teaching I give to help explain why my students enjoy it.

I have also included syllabi from past courses, as well as courses I'm prepared to teach in the future, including philosophy of art, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of literature.

Testimonials

Testimonial 1—Phenomenology and Aesthetics Spring 2016

To whom it may concern,

This letter expresses my substantial support of Steven DeLay in his capacity as a tutor, scholar, and member of both Christ Church College and the Faculty of Philosophy. I have come to know Steven as his student in both Hilary and Trinity terms of the 2015/16 academic year. In Hilary, we worked on a tutorial structured around the philosophy of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. In Trinity, I undertook an undergraduate thesis option (as a component of my exchange program) in phenomenology and aesthetics, with a focus on Husserl, Jean-Luc Marion, and Michel Henry. In both capacities I found Steven to be an insightful, respectful, and exceptionally competent teacher.

Throughout the Hilary term, Steven structured a broad and challenging introductory course to phenomenology. He was very discerning with regards to shaping the course as the weeks progressed to fit either my particular interests, or to give more time to work on the complex concepts I struggled with. Within each tutorial, he would often bring up additional reading materials that were suited to my interests in case I wanted to pursue a more nuanced understanding of the philosophers studied. This showed that he was both passionate about the material and receptive to my growing interest in phenomenology. This would be highly influential for my own academic growth, as delving further into phenomenology inspired me to make it the central focus of my thesis in Trinity. In each step of this process, he was always available and prompt to respond via email to all my inquiries.

Towards the end of the Hilary term, Steven and I discussed the possibility of commencing a thesis in phenomenology. He offered various ways to pursue this, giving both survey material and works by philosophers we had not yet studied (such as Henry, Sartre, and Ricoeur). We met in addition to our tutorials in weeks 7 and 8 of term, at which point I brought ideas for directions to take the thesis. In the weeks following the end of term up until the beginning of Trinity, we were in dialogue via email about the thesis and specific reading material. His guidance was always constructive rather than authoritative, and the eventual focus of the thesis was only bound by the restriction that he felt comfortable and competent working with the texts that I proposed.

In Trinity, Steven and I met 7 or 8 times to work on the thesis. While the guidelines for my program outlined that this was near double the requisite amount of meetings, he was accommodating to my need for in-person discussion about the material. This behavior held true when I became ill in week 3 of term, where he was both flexible and understanding. He consistently offered constructive criticism, advice about structural elements of the writing, and the general content of the paper.

Perhaps the most marked feature of Steven's character was the way in which he explained philosophy, both in structured tutorials and thesis meetings. When discussing particular aspects of a philosopher's work, he was able to lucidly explain the concept as it pertained to the history of philosophy in general, particularly the subtle criticisms and extensions that phenomenologists have of and with each other. Through this, I came to understand the value of a small component of a work in terms of its broader context. When Steven explains philosophy, he expresses a clear ardor for the subject matter, as well as for teaching it to others. While I have had successful and fulfilling tutorials with other members of the faculty, including Beth Cykowski and Yuuki Ohta, this aspect of Steven's teaching style is something that cannot be matched.

Aside from having extensive knowledge of the 4 philosophers studied, Steven's expertise in other realms was also integral to our work together. He was excited and interested in discussing the intersections of phenomenology and aesthetics, of phenomenology and theology, and of the prevailing separation of continental and analytic philosophy. At no point in our discussions did I ever feel that he held academic, intellectual, political, or religious views that impinged upon his explication of philosophical concepts. In every meeting (between 15 and 20 over the past 5 months) he was supportive, considerate, and enthusiastic to engage in discourse about complex material. His influence as a tutor is evident in my decision to continue to work with him on an extended research project of my design; a decision that I believe will positively impact my future academic work in philosophy (such as post-graduate specialization). Working with Steven has been one of the most intellectually fruitful experiences of my college career, and I can attest to his distinction as a teacher, scholar, and productive member of an academic community.

If further comment or clarification is needed, please be in contact via the email listed in the header of this letter (if this should be after August of 2016, please use the address Katrina@harple.com).

Sincerely,

Katrina Dew Harple

Testimonial 2—Schopenhauer Fall 2014

Steven taught me in MT14 for the Post-Kantian paper (Schopenhauer). He demonstrated a very broad knowledge of post-Kantian philosophy as a whole, and helped me make links between a range of post-Kantian philosophers, often beyond the requirements of the paper. For example, I had never studied Sartre directly as a philosopher but had studied his literature in a Modern Languages paper; Steven encouraged me, both in tutorials and via email, to explore further some links I observed between Schopenhauer's and Sartre's ideas. Unfortunately I was unable to utilise some of this thinking in the final exam, and performed rather poorly due to illness, but Steven's encouragement greatly enriched my understanding and appreciation of the post-Kantian landscape nonetheless. During the revision period, it was the paper I found myself thinking about most in my spare time, and I felt more engaged in it than any other.

With regard to Schopenhauer, Steven was both willing and able to elucidate Schopenhauer's ideas in simpler terms when needed, but then delve into the more complex issues once I was fully comfortable with the material. I would say his main strength lies precisely in his ability to give the wider picture, and then to explore with the student the finer details and dilemmas. For a philosopher like Schopenhauer, who developed such an extensive system of thought spanning across almost all branches of philosophy, this was definitely the most helpful approach from my perspective.

What I found most refreshing was that Steven wasn't afraid to veer away from the traditional commentary to offer a different way of looking at things, and this made me feel more comfortable in doing the same, not just in the Post-Kantian paper. His demeanour is engaging and youthful, and our tutorials felt more like two colleagues meeting to discuss a common interest (albeit one guiding the other) than a teacher instructing his pupil.

I would therefore highly recommend Steven; I think he has both the knowledge and the manner required to engage students in what is ultimately a very exciting area of philosophy.

Lucy Welch
Philosophy & Modern Languages
Graduated in 2015

Testimonial 3—Knowledge and Reality Spring 2015

My name is Gao Ge, and I'm now in my second year of the BA Philosophy, Politics and Economic course at Oriel College, Oxford University. In my first year's General Philosophy module, I had the great pleasure to be taught by Mr Steven DeLay.

Mr DeLay was a wonderful tutor on many levels. He was always patient, amicable and willing to engage in lively discussions. On essays, Mr DeLay also provided valuable advice that clearly pointed out the directions of future improvements.

Academically speaking, Mr DeLay excelled at explaining philosophical theories which seemed confusing at first glance. For instance, on Moore's proof of external knowledge, Mr DeLay clarified the proof by demonstrating that it was constructed to force us to choose between scepticism and the belief that we had hands, and therefore force us to abandon scepticism for its seemingly implausible inferences.

Moreover, Mr DeLay was always committed to introducing fascinating new materials and broadening the contents of the tutorials beyond what was prescribed by the common syllables. On the topic of personal identity, for instance, besides presenting the typical psychological and somatic approaches, Mr DeLay further introduced the brilliant approach forwarded by Sartre in his *Being and Nothingness*, which viewed our identity as fundamentally unsettled, and our existence as the process of constantly negotiating our identity. In the tutorial on mind and body, Mr DeLay also broadened the discussion by introducing the theory of functionalism.

I thoroughly enjoyed my term with Mr DeLay. Without his help, it wouldn't have been possible for me to get a distinction in my Prelim exams. And I'm sure every student would be lucky to be taught by Mr DeLay.

Husserl and Merleau-Ponty

Hilary Term 2016
Steven DeLay
Christ Church, Oxford

Course Description

Our tutorial will survey the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, with special emphasis on their respective philosophies of perception, the body, and intersubjectivity. Secondary readings are always available upon request, but the weekly reading assignments will focus primarily on primary texts.

Texts

Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations* (*CM*)

Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. D. Carr, Evanston, IL: Northwestern Press. (*TC*)

Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. C. Smith, London: Routledge (*PP*)

Franck, Didier (2014). *Flesh and Body: on the Phenomenology of Husserl*, trans. J. Rivera and S. Davidson, New York: Bloomsbury Press. (*FB*)

Week 1 What is phenomenology?

CM, Introduction and First Meditation

PP, Preface

Crowell, S. 'Husserlian Phenomenology', *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism*, ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall (London: Blackwell, 2006), 9-30.

Crowell, S. 'Transcendental Phenomenology and the seductions of naturalism: subjectivity, consciousness, and meaning', *The Oxford Handbook to Contemporary Phenomenology*, ed. Dan Zahavi.

Week 2 What is phenomenology? (cont.)

CM, Second and Fourth Meditations

FB, Chapter Two ("Science as Ecology") and Chapter Four ("Constitutive Analysis")

Week 3 The Body

PP, Part One: The Body, §§1-3, pp. 67-147

FB, Chapter Three ("Flesh and Body in Perception")

Week 4 The Body (cont.)

PP, Part One: The Body, §§4-6, pp. 148-174

Week 5 Cogito and Other

CM, Fifth Meditation

PP, Part Three: The World as Perceived, §4, pp.346-368

Week 6 Cogito and Other (cont.)

FB, Chapters Eight (“Flesh and the Sphere of Ownness”) through Fourteen (“The Dynamic of Apperceptive Transfer”), pp. 77-136

Week 7 Art

Merleau-Ponty, “Cezanne’s Doubt”

Phenomenology and the Theological Turn

Michaelmas 2015
Steven DeLay
Christ Church, Oxford

Week 2

Husserl says that phenomenology is ‘first philosophy’. Phenomenology is ‘first philosophy’, he contends, because it is the science of consciousness, or, the ‘rigorous science’ as he puts it. Identify and explain the key features of Husserl’s science of consciousness. What distinguishes it from naturalism and historicism? Are there problems with it?

Texts:

Husserl, ‘Phenomenology as Rigorous Science’

Crowell, S. ‘Husserlian Phenomenology’, *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism*, ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall (London: Blackwell, 2006), 9-30.

Crowell, S. ‘Transcendental Phenomenology and the seductions of naturalism: subjectivity, consciousness, and meaning’, *The Oxford Handbook to Contemporary Phenomenology*, ed. Dan Zahavi.

Week 4

Explicate Jean-Luc Marion’s conception of phenomenology as first philosophy. Next, summarize Michel Henry’s summary of the four principles of phenomenology. Do you think Henry’s criticism of Marion is valid?

Texts:

Henry, M. ‘The Four Principles of Phenomenology’. *Continental Philosophy Review*.

Marion, J-L. ‘Phenomenology of Givenness and First Philosophy’ Marion, J.-L (2002b). *In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena*, trans. Robyn Horner and Vincent Berraud. New York: Fordham University Press.

Marion, J-L. ‘The Possible and Revelation’ Marion, J.-L. (2008). *The Visible and the Revealed*, trans. Christina Gschwandtner. New York: Fordham University Press.

Week 6

Explain Henry’s distinction between the world and life. In light of it, what does it mean to be ‘born again’? Does Henry’s portrayal of ‘Christian ethics’ support or undermine his view of the self as a being who is not a being-in-the-world?

Texts:

Henry, M. 2003. ‘The Second Birth’. In *I am the Truth: towards a philosophy of Christianity*, trans. S. Emmanuel. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Henry, M. 2003. ‘The Christian Ethic’. In *I am the Truth: towards a philosophy of Christianity*, trans. S. Emmanuel. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Rivera, J. ‘Generation, interiority and the phenomenology of Christianity in Michel Henry’. *Continental Philosophy Review* 44(2) pp. 205-235, 2011.

Week 8

Does Janicaud's critique of the 'new phenomenology' work? Why or why not? Use the Chrétien piece as an example, but feel free to use the Henry and Marion we have read too. Does Steinbock's view counter any of Janicaud's charges? Why or why not?

Texts:

Chrétien, J-L. 2015. 'Biblical Figures of Joy'. In *Under the Gaze of the Bible*, trans. J. Dunaway. New York: Fordham University Press.

Janicaud, D. (2001). *French Phenomenology and the 'Theological Turn': the French Debate*, (eds.) D. Janicaud and J.F Coutine. New York: Fordham University Press.

Steinbock, A. 2013. 'Evidence in the phenomenology of religious experience'. In *The Oxford Handbook to Contemporary Phenomenology*, ed. D. Zahavi.

General Philosophy (Knowledge and Reality)

Trinity 2015

Oriel College Honours PPE Programme, Oxford

Steven DeLay and Michelle Lui

Syllabus The topics to be studied are: (1) knowledge and scepticism; (2) induction; (3) the relation of mind and body, (4) personal identity, (5) free will, and (6) god and evil.

Key concepts It is expected that, as a result of studying General Philosophy, students should have acquired a basic familiarity with the following key concepts:

The *a priori* / *a posteriori* distinction; compatibilism *vs.* incompatibilism; counter-examples; deduction and induction; determinism; dualism; epiphenomenalism; externalism; identity and Leibniz's Law; inference to the best explanation, libertarianism; necessary and sufficient conditions; necessity and possible worlds; physicalism; scepticism; solipsism; thought-experiments.

Recommended reading

To cover one of these topics satisfactorily, it will not usually be necessary for a student to read *everything* that this reading list recommends for that topic – especially if the student only has one tutorial on that topic. It will normally be sufficient for the student to read just *four* of the recommended readings. As always, students should seek, and follow, the advice of their tutor on what it is best to read.

General introductory reading

Simon Blackburn, *Think* (Oxford UP, 1999)

Earl Conee and Theodore Sider, *Riddles of Existence* (Oxford UP, 2005)

1. Knowledge and Scepticism

René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy* (trans. John Cottingham), Meditation I.

David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Section XII.

D. M. Armstrong, "The Thermometer Model of Knowledge", in Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske (eds.) *Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology* (Oxford UP 2000), pp.72-85.

Edmund Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", *Analysis* 23 (1963): pp. 121-123.

Laurence Bonjour, "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 5 (1980), pp. 53-73. Reprinted in Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske (eds.) *Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology* (OUP 2000).

G. E. Moore, "Proof of an External World", in Michael Huemer (ed.) *Epistemology: Contemporary Readings* (Routledge 2002), Chapter 9, pp. 602-605. First published in *Proceedings of the British Academy* 25 (1939): 273-300. Reprinted in Moore, *Philosophical Papers*, (Allen & Unwin, 1959), Chapter 7, pp. 127-150. 2

Robert Nozick, “Knowledge and Skepticism”, in Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations* (Oxford UP, 1981), pp. 167–185.

2. Induction

David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Sections IV-V.

Wesley Salmon, “An Encounter with David Hume”, in Joel Feinberg et al. (ed.), *Reason and Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems of Philosophy*, 13th edition (Wadsworth, 2008), pp. 245–63 (also in earlier editions of this volume).

P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory* (Methuen, 1952), Chapter 9, pp. 233-263.

Karl Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, revised edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), Chap. 1.

3. Mind and Body

René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy* (trans. John Cottingham), Meditations II and VI.

Margaret D. Wilson “Descartes: The Epistemological Argument for Mind-Body Distinctness”, *Noûs* 10 (1976): 3–15.

Jaegwon Kim, *Philosophy of Mind*, 2nd edition (Westview Press, 2005), Chaps. 1 and 2.

Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, *Philosophical Quarterly* 32 (1982):127–136; reprinted in Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa and Daniel Stoljar, eds. *There’s Something About Mary* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004).

Frank Jackson, “What Mary Didn’t Know” *Journal of Philosophy* 83 (1986): 291–295; reprinted in Ludlow et al., *There’s Something About Mary* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004).

David Lewis, “What Experience Teaches”, in William G. Lycan (ed.), *Mind and Cognition* (Blackwell: 1990); reprinted in Lewis, *Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology* (Cambridge UP, 1999), 262–90; in David Chalmers (ed.), *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (Oxford UP, 2002); in Tim O’Connor and David Robb (eds.), *Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings* (Routledge, 2003); and in Ludlow et al., *There’s Something About Mary*. 3

4. Personal Identity

John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chapter XXVII.

Eric Olson, “Personal Identity”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* <<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/>>

Bernard Williams, “The self and the future”, *Philosophical Review* 79 (1970): pp. 161–180; Reprinted in Williams, *Problems of the Self* (Cambridge UP, 1973); in John Perry (ed.), *Personal Identity* (University of California Press, 1975); and in Raymond Martin and John Barresi (eds.) *Personal Identity* (Blackwell, 2003).

Derek Parfit, “Why Our Identity is Not What Matters”, in Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford UP, 1984), Chapter 12, pp. 245-280. Reprinted in Raymond Martin and John Barresi (eds.) *Personal Identity* (Blackwell, 2003), pp. 115-143.

Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne, *Personal Identity* (Blackwell, 1984).

5. Free Will

David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Section VIII.

A. J. Ayer, “Freedom and Necessity”, in Ayer, *Philosophical Essays* (London: Macmillan, 1954), pp. 271–84. Reprinted in Gary Watson (ed.), *Free Will*, 1st edition (Oxford UP, 1982).

Roderick Chisholm, “Human Freedom and the Self”, reprinted in Gary Watson (ed.), *Free Will*, 1st and 2nd editions (Oxford UP, 2003); and in Robert Kane (ed.), *Free Will* (Blackwell, 2002).

Peter Van Inwagen, “The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism” *Philosophical Studies* 27 (1975): pp. 185-99. Reprinted in Watson (ed.), *Free Will*, 1st edition (Oxford UP, 1982); and in Robert Kane (ed.), *Free Will* (Blackwell, 2002).

Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, *Journal of Philosophy*, 66 (1969): pp. 829-839. Reprinted in Gary Watson (ed.) *Free Will*, 2nd edition (OUP 2002), pp. 167-176; and in Frankfurt, *The Importance of What We Care About* (Cambridge UP, 1988). 4

6. God and Evil

David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* X, XI

René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy* (trans. John Cottingham), Meditations IV and V.

J. L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence”, *Mind* 64 (1955): pp. 200-212; Reprinted in M. M. Adams and R. M Adams (eds.), *The Problem of Evil* (Oxford UP, 1990), Chap. 1.

W. L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism”, *American Philosophical Quarterly* 16 (1979): pp. 335-341; Reprinted in Adams and Adams, *The Problem of Evil*, Chapter 7.

Alvin Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity* (Oxford UP, 1974), Chapter 9; Reprinted as “God, Evil and the Metaphysics of Freedom” in Adams and Adams, *The Problem of Evil*, Chapter 5.

Richard Swinburne, *Is There A God?* revised edition (Oxford UP, 2010), Chap. 6.

Peter van Inwagen, “The Argument from Evil”, in Peter van Inwagen (ed.), *Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil* (Grand Rapids: Erdmans, 2004), pp. 55-73.

Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, and Freud

Michaelmas Term 2014

Steven DeLay

Christ Church, Oxford

Nietzsche held Dostoevsky in the highest regard, writing that he was “the only psychologist from whom I have anything to learn.” Likewise Freud was a great admirer of Dostoevsky, calling *The Brothers Karamazov* “the greatest novel ever written.” This high praise should not come as a complete surprise. For Dostoevsky, just like Freud and Nietzsche, was singly obsessed with what he himself called life’s “accursed questions”: the existence of God, the question of immortality, and the issue of whether human existence has any ultimate meaning or purpose. Our first topic of inquiry, thus, will be Dostoevsky’s own portrayal and understanding of human psychology, the question of God, and life’s purpose. Having done so, we shall then in turn examine Nietzsche’s and Freud’s respective takes on the matter. In short, our goal is not only to understand each of these thinkers on his own terms, but to reconstruct his thought in a way that lets us put these three giants in productive dialogue with one another.

Tutorial 1 *Notes from Underground*

Essay 1

In *Notes from Underground*, Dostoevsky provides us a striking psychological exposé of a human psyche gone rotten. Indeed, the novella’s narrator and namesake, the Underground Man, himself admits that something deeply, deeply disturbing is at work in him: “I am a sick man...I am a spiteful man.” What, though, is it exactly about the Underground Man that Dostoevsky wants us to realize is sick? Next, use the Underground Man’s own “sickness of soul” as your foil to construct and describe what you imagine Dostoevsky’s ideal of what a healthy psyche must alternatively consist in.

Primary texts

Dostoevsky, Fyodor. 2003. *Notes from Underground*, translated by Constance Garnett, Barnes & Noble Classics.

Dostoevsky, Fyodor. 2003. “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man,” translated by Constance Garnett.

St John Cassian. 1979. “On the Eight Vices: Written for Bishop Kastor,” pp. 73-93. In *The Philokalia: the complete text*, translated and edited by G.E.H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware.

Suggested secondary texts

Frank, Joseph. 2010. “Notes from Underground,” pp. 413-440. In *Dostoevsky: A Writer in His Time*, edited by Mary Petusewicz, Princeton University Press.

Jones, Malcom. 2005. “Dostoevsky’s Journey of Religious Discovery: A Biographical Introduction,” pp. 1-24. In *Dostoevsky and the Dynamics of Religious Experience*, Anthem Press.

Tutorial 2 *Crime and Punishment*

Essay 2

One way to situate the literary, psychological, and philosophical significance of Raskalnikov is by considering him in light of the *Übermensch* ideal—the “cult of the great man” that was so particularly fashionable among those in nineteenth-century Romantic circles and later immortalized by Nietzsche. One of the central stakes of *Crime and Punishment*, thus, is Dostoevsky’s attempt to at once countenance and reject the viability of the *Übermensch* cult- of-personality. For inasmuch as Raskalnikov fails to attain the lofty greatness he wishes to, we are encouraged to infer that there’s something inherently dubious about the very notion of the *Übermensch* to begin with. If, as Dostoevsky argues, anyone who attempts to live as an *Übermensch* is bound to fail, what must be true of human nature to explain the inevitability of such a failure? Is this conception of the human condition, one which insists that there are certain inherent and inescapable limitations to the power of human self-determination, at all persuasive? In short, is Dostoevsky’s argument that the *Übermensch* is both an unachievable and undesirable goal convincing? Why or why not? We’ll revisit this question once we’ve read Nietzsche, but feel free to draw on Nietzsche here, if you wish.

Primary texts

Dostoevsky, Fyodor. 1993. *Crime and Punishment: a Novel in Six Parts with Epilogue*, translated by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, Vintage Books.

St Mark the Ascetic. 1979. “Letter to Nicolas the Solitary,” pp. 147-160. In *The Philokalia: the complete text*, translated and edited by G.E.H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware.

Suggested secondary texts

Frank, Joseph. 2010. “Crime and Punishment,” pp. 483-508. In *Dostoevsky: A Writer in His Time*, edited by Mary Petusewicz, Princeton University Press.

Johae, Antony. 2001. “Towards an iconography of Crime and Punishment,” pp. 173-188. In *Dostoevsky and the Christian Tradition*, edited by George Pattison and Diane Oenning Thompson, Cambridge University Press.

Russell, Henry. 2001. “Beyond the will: Humiliation as Christian necessity in *Crime and Punishment*,” pp. 226-236. In *Dostoevsky and the Christian Tradition*, edited by George Pattison and Diane Oenning Thompson, Cambridge University Press.

Tutorial 3 *The Idiot*

Essay 3

In private letters, Dostoevsky explained that the goal of *The Idiot* was to depict a perfectly “beautiful man.” Explain in what sense Prince Myshkin behaves as a truly “beautiful man” ought to. In doing so, feel free to make use of the Underground Man and Raskalnikov as telling foils to the Prince—Dostoevsky would have expected his readers to keep his earlier “neurotic” characters in mind, when thinking about his “beautiful” one. Do you find

Dostoevsky's ideal of the beautiful man persuasive? Finally, consider that the Prince hardly seems to triumph. Instead, by novel's end he has receded back into madness, again destitute and now humiliated. What lessons about the nature of human existence and human suffering do you think Dostoevsky wishes us to draw, given the ignominy of the Prince's fate?

Primary texts

Dostoevsky, Fyodor. 2001. *The Idiot*, translated by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, Vintage Books.

Suggested secondary texts

Frank, Joseph. 2010. "The Idiot," pp. 577-589. In *Dostoevsky: A Writer in His Time*, edited by Mary Petusewicz, Princeton University Press.

Tutorial 4 *The Brothers Karamazov*

Essay 4

The patriarch of the Karamazovs, Fyodor Pavlovich, is a self-professed "sensualist." The middle brother, Ivan, is a cold rationalist. The eldest son, Mitya, is a passionate hothead. The youngest, Alyosha, is a meek, innocent babe. Describe their respective psychologies, and the family dynamic in general with reference to particular events in the text. Which, if any, of the Karamazovs do you find admirable? Which do you find not so? Finally, consider the narrator's remark in the introduction when he writes that Alyosha is the novel's hero. Why do you think the narrator expects the reader to find Alyosha an odd choice? Based on what you've learned thus far of the Karamazovs, do you think there is anything particularly or possibly heroic about the youngest son?

Primary texts

Dostoevsky, Fyodor. 1990. *The Brothers Karamazov: a Novel in Four Parts with Epilogue*, translated by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, North Point Press.

St Mark the Ascetic. 1979. "On the Spiritual Law: two hundred texts," pp. 109-124. In *The Philokalia: the complete text*, translated and edited by G.E.H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware.

Suggested secondary texts

Cunningham, David. 2001. "*The Brothers Karamazov* as trinitarian theology," pp. 134-155. In *Dostoevsky and the Christian Tradition*, edited by George Pattison and Diane Oenning Thompson, Cambridge University Press.

Frank, Joseph. 2010. "The Brothers Karamazov: Books 1-4," pp.848-866. In *Dostoevsky: A Writer in His Time*, edited by Mary Petusewicz, Princeton University Press.

Ziolkowski, Margaret. 2001. "Dostoevsky and the kenotic tradition," pp. 31-40. In *Dostoevsky and the Christian Tradition*, edited by George Pattison and Diane Oenning Thompson, Cambridge University Press.

Tutorial 5 *The Brothers Karamazov*

Essay 5

Father Zosima, in his homilies shortly before his death, expresses the deepest, most personal religious commitments of Dostoevsky himself. Indeed, in private letters, Dostoevsky admitted that the entire novel is supposed to be a response to Ivan's atheist manifesto in the "Grand Inquisitor" chapter. State, as you see it, Ivan's critique of God. Then, in light of the rest of the novel's significant events—Zosima's own doctrines, Ivan's subsequent descent into madness, Mitya's conviction and imprisonment, and Alyosha's speech to the boys after Illyusha's funeral—reconstruct as best you can what you think Dostoevsky's counter-argument to Ivan's challenge amounts to. Last but not least, do you think Dostoevsky's theodicy is successful?

Primary texts

Dostoevsky, Fyodor. 1990. *The Brothers Karamazov: a Novel in Four Parts with Epilogue*, translated by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, North Point Press.

Suggested secondary texts

Frank, Joseph. 2010. "The Brothers Karamazov: Books 5-6," pp.867-885. In *Dostoevsky: A Writer in His Time*, edited by Mary Petusewicz, Princeton University Press.

Frank, Joseph. 2010. "The Brothers Karamazov: Books 7-12," pp.886-911. In *Dostoevsky: A Writer in His Time*, edited by Mary Petusewicz, Princeton University Press.

Jones, Malcom. 2005. "Religious Polemic in Narrative Form: *The Brothers Karamazov*," pp. 103-146. In *Dostoevsky and the Dynamics of Religious Experience*, Anthem Press.

Tutorial 6 *The Genealogy of Morals*

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1996. *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*, translated by Walter Kaufmann, Oxford University Press.

Essay 6

Reconstruct Nietzsche's explanation of the origin of the distinction between good and evil: slave morality, *ressentiment*, and so on. On such a view, explain what it would entail to live like an *Übermensch*. With all this in mind, consider Dostoevsky's implicit critique of such an ideal vis-à-vis his depiction of the Underground Man and Raskalnikov. What, if anything, can be said on behalf and in favour of Nietzsche's view in response to Dostoevsky's critique?

Moreover, consider Nietzsche's implicit critique of the Christian saint. Where Dostoevsky sees a willingness to suffer humiliation and persecution as a sign of genuine strength, Nietzsche would diagnose such a willingness as little more than a veiled form of weakness. Who's right?

Tutorial 7 *The Future of an Illusion*

Essay 7

Freud thinks religious belief is infantile and clearly false. Its origin, he thinks, is a need for metaphysical solace. Can his theory of wish-fulfilment explain away religious belief, as he thinks? What would Dostoevsky say in reply to Freud's challenge? In short, is religious belief truly illusory? Why or why not?

Kierkegaard

Michaelmas Term 2014
Steven DeLay
Christ Church, Oxford

Because there are countless ways one might choose to examine the thought of Kierkegaard, and just as many issues that could accordingly occupy one's attention, it is impossible to provide an exhaustive account of every nook-and-cranny of his oeuvre in any one single course. Be that as it may, Kierkegaard's authorship can for all that still be treated systematically as a whole, provided one chooses a trusty guiding thread to do so. We'll take a telling because emblematic remark of his as ours. He writes, "Qualitatively a self is what its criterion is." Our task, then, will be to make sense of two obvious questions this remark naturally occasions. The first question: what are the possible criteria by which a self can measure itself? And the second: why, according to Kierkegaard, is faith the best? Or, to put everything another way if you like, what does he think it is to be a self?

Tutorial 1 *Either/Or* and *Stages on Life's Way*, or, On Choosing Oneself

Essay 1

Discuss Kierkegaard's distinction between the so-called "aesthetic" and "ethical" ways of human existence. What are the measures that define each? Are the arguments in favour of the ethical's putative superiority to the aesthetic actually convincing? Why or why not?

Primary texts

Kierkegaard, Søren. 1987. *Either/Or Part I*, translated by Howard and Edna Hong, Princeton University Press.

Kierkegaard, Søren. 1987. *Either/Or Part II*, translated by Howard and Edna Hong, Princeton University Press.

Kierkegaard, Søren. 1988. *Stage's on Life's Way*, translated by Howard and Edna Hong, Princeton University Press.

Suggested secondary texts

Davenport, John. 2012. "Narrative Unity, Autonomy, and Kierkegaard's Aesthetic-Ethical Distinction," pp. 91-127. In *Narrative Identity, Autonomy, and Mortality: from Frankfurt and MacIntyre to Kierkegaard*, Routledge.

Evans, Stephen & Roberts, Robert. 2013. "Ethics," pp. 211-229. In *The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard*, University of Oxford Press

Pattison, George. 2012. *Kierkegaard: the Aesthetic and the Religious*, SCM Publishing.

Pattison, George. 2005. *The Philosophy of Kierkegaard*, Acumen Publishing Limited.

Tutorial 2 *Fear and Trembling*; or, Faith as the Self's Measure?

Essay 2

Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling* is perhaps best remembered for its famous distinction between the "ethical" and "religious" categories of existence. Explain as best you can what he means by "a teleological suspension of the ethical," distinguishing the Hegelian and Kantian conceptions of the ethical from Kierkegaard's own Abrahamic measure of faith. How, if at all, does the text's portrayal of the distinction between the "knight of resignation," on the one hand, and the "knight of faith," on the other, shed light on such a suspension? Something to mull over when considering all this is the issue of whether love can be a duty; Kierkegaard's view would seem to suggest that any strictly "ethical" system has no such place for love, because only a religious commitment to faith allows love to assume its rightful pride of place as the true measure of a human being's existence. Is he right about that? If not, why is he mistaken?

Primary texts

Kierkegaard, Søren. 1983. *Fear and Trembling*, translated by Howard and Edna Wong, Princeton University Press.

Suggested secondary texts

Evans, Stephen. 2006. "Faith as the *Telos* of Morality: A Reading of *Fear and Trembling*," pp. 209-224. In *Kierkegaard on Faith and Self: Collected Essays*,

Ferreira, Jamie. 1998. "Faith and the Kierkegaardian leap," pp. 207-234. In *The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard*, Cambridge University Press.

Ferreira, Jamie. 2013. "Love," pp. 328-343. In *The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard*, University of Oxford Press.

Krishek, Sharon. 2009. *Kierkegaard on Faith and Love*, Cambridge University Press.

Westphal, Merold. 1998. "Kierkegaard and Hegel," pp. 101-124. In *The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard*, Cambridge University Press.

Tutorial 3 *The Sickness unto Death*; or, Why Anything but Faith is Despair

Essay 3

In *The Sickness unto Death*, Kierkegaard claims to identify two forms of despair. One, he writes, is the despair of "not willing to be oneself"; the second, he claims, is the despair of "willing to be oneself." Explain what he has in mind with this paradoxical formulation. Having done so, evaluate what might be the most crucial claim of the entire work; namely, that *if* it were the case that the human self had established itself, *then* only the first form would be possible, but not the second. As he explains it, because the second form of despair is "the expression for the inability of the self to arrive at or to be in equilibrium and rest by itself, but only, in relating itself to itself, by relating itself to that which has established the entire relation," it follows on this definition that the self's ability to "will to be itself" but nonetheless remain in despair entails that there is a God. Hence his subsequent formula for *faith*, the supposed one and only antithesis to despair: "The

formula that describes the state of the self when despair is completely rooted out is this: in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it.” Is Kierkegaard right? Is the second form of despair indeed only possible if there is a power outside the self that has established it? Why or why not?

Primary texts

Kierkegaard, Søren. 1980. *The Sickness unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening*, translated by Howard and Edna Hong, Princeton University Press.

Suggested secondary texts

Dahlstrom, Daniel. 2010. “Freedom through Despair: Kierkegaard’s Phenomenological Analysis.” In *Kierkegaard as Phenomenologist: An Experiment*, edited by Jeffrey Hanson, Northwestern University Press.

Evans, Stephen. 2006. “Who is the Other in Kierkegaard’s Sickness unto Death? God and Human Relations in the Constitution of Self,” pp. 263-276. In *Kierkegaard on Faith and Self: Collected Essays*,

Evans, Stephen. 2006. “Kierkegaard’s View of the Unconscious,” pp. 270-300. In *Kierkegaard on Faith and Self: Collected Essays*, Baylor University Press.

Theunissen, Michael. 2005. *Kierkegaard’s Concept of Despair*, translated by Barbara Harshav and Helmut Illbruck, Princeton University Press.

Tutorial 4 *Works of Love*; or, the Measure Enacted

Essay 4

In *Works of Love*, we find love cast as a duty made possible by faith. If for Kierkegaard faith is the human being’s highest calling, pick two instances of what he here calls works of love and explain in what sense you imagine he thinks the two works you’ve chosen to discuss presuppose and embody faith. Do you find this portrayal of faith and love as standing in a relation of reciprocal exchange convincing? In short, is Kierkegaard right that love is the highest, best, and truest criterion of a self? If you agree, say why. If not, make your case for a different measure.

Primary texts

Kierkegaard, Søren. 2009. *Works of Love*, translated by Howard and Edna Hong, Harper Collins Publishers.

Suggested secondary texts

Ferreira, Jamie. 2001. *Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love*, Oxford University Press.

Bloechl, Jeffrey. 2010. "Kierkegaard between Fundamental Ontology and Theology: Phenomenological Approaches to Love of God." In *Kierkegaard as Phenomenologist: An Experiment*, edited by Jeffrey Hanson, Northwestern University Press

Phenomenology and the Work of Art

Steven DeLay

Course Description

What is the work of art? How are the work of art and the work of philosophy related to one another? The phenomenological tradition is known for taking the philosophical role and implications of art seriously. Many of the great figures of early twentieth century phenomenology, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty among them, offered provocative and careful analyses of the importance, value, and status of art. More recently, Jean-Luc Marion, Michel Henry, and Jean-Louis Chrétien have continued phenomenology's legacy of seriously taking up the question of art's *raison d'être*. In this course we will do the same through close readings of key phenomenological texts that examine art's philosophical import and broader cultural significance.

Readings

Weeks 1 and 2

Adorno, Theodor. (2004) *Aesthetic Theory*. Translated by R.H. Kentor. London: Continuum Press.

Week 3 and 4

Chrétien, Jean-Louis. (2004) *The Call and the Response*. Translated by S. Lewis. New York, NY: Fordham University Press.

Week 5 and 6

Chrétien, Jean-Louis. (2003) *Hand to Hand: Listening to the Work of Art*. Translated by S. Lewis. New York, NY: Fordham University Press.

Week 7 and 8

Heidegger, Martin. 'On the Origin of the Work of Art'. In D.F. Krell ed., *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings* (San Francisco, CA: Harpers Collins Publishers), 139-212.

Weeks 9 and 10

Henry, Michel. (2009). *Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky*. Translated by S. Davidson. New York, NY: Continuum Press.

Week 11

Marion, Jean-Luc. (2002) 'The Idol or the Radiance of the Painting'. In *In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena*. Translated by R. Horner and V. Berraud. (New York, NY: Fordham University Press), 54-81.

Week 12

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. (1964) 'Cézanne's Doubt'. In *Sense and Non-Sense*. Translated by P.A. Dreyfus (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press), 9-25.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. (1964) 'Eye and Mind'. In *The Primacy of Perception: And other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics*. Translated by C. Dallery (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press), 159-192.

Exams

There will be three examinations:

Two in-class exams; each consisting of two short essays

A term paper, at least 15 double-sided pages, that serves as the final exam

In the in-class exams, you will demonstrate what you have learned from the assigned readings and lectures. In the term paper, you will apply the gained knowledge to a personal topic of interest that relates to the world of art viewed from the perspective of phenomenological philosophy.

In each of the in-class exams, you will be asked to answer two short essay questions (there will be three options per question from which to choose). These two exams will not only allow you the opportunity to demonstrate what you've learned from the readings and lecture discussions; they will also acclimate you to the sort of questions and issues at stake in contemporary phenomenology of art.

A long essay will serve as your final exam. Shortly after the second in-class exam, you will submit a proposed topic along with a brief outline for your term paper. The paper is your chance to demonstrate at length and in detail your knowledge of what the texts say and what you yourself think about what they have to say. The assigned readings should therefore be the primary focus of the term paper; however, secondary sources can also be used. You should also of course feel free to focus on any specific works of art that we have analyzed during the semester. I will be sure to provide feedback on your proposal before you begin the actual writing of the paper.

It is useful to be thinking about the week's readings in light of the final paper. By coming to each set of readings with a mind to how you see those and the previous texts informing one another, you'll be able to better appreciate the common problems and shared issues to which the texts respond. The term paper can also be an opportunity for you to do some phenomenology of art for yourself, which is the very point of phenomenological philosophy, and precisely what makes it so great and rewarding. As Husserl himself, phenomenology's founder, said: 'To the things themselves!'

Grades

The first two exams each compose **30%** of your final grade.

The term paper composes the remaining **40%**.

I do not provide credit for attendance. However, if you have enrolled in the class, you are expected to attend. We will be looking at works of art and discussing what we see, so there will be material from class discussion on the exams that cannot be gleaned from the readings alone!

Philosophy of Mind

Steven DeLay

Course Description

This course surveys contemporary philosophy of mind. We will draw on the collective resources of both the analytic and continental traditions. Topics to be examined include: the mind-body problem, the problem of intentionality, phenomenal consciousness, and the question of what exactly a mind is.

Week 1 Introduction: What is the Mind?

Haugeland, J. 'The Saga of the Modern Mind', in *Artificial Intelligence: the Very Idea* (MIT, 1989).
Haugeland, J. 'The Intentionality All-Stars', *Philosophical Perspectives*, Vol. 4. pp. 383-427, 1990.

Week 2 Phenomenal Consciousness

Nagel, T. 1974. 'What is it like to be a bat?', *Philosophical Review*. Reprinted in his *Mortal Questions* and elsewhere.
Siewert, C. 1998. *The Significance of Consciousness*. Princeton University Press.

Week 3 Physicalism

Crane, T. & D. H. Mellor 1990. There is no question of physicalism. *Mind*, 99 (394): 185-206.
Fodor, J. 1974. Special sciences (or: the disunity of science as a working hypothesis). *Synthese*, 28: 97-115. Reprinted in Chalmers 2002.
McGinn, C. 1980. Philosophical materialism, *Synthese*, 44: 173-206. Reprinted in *The Problem of Consciousness* (Blackwell, 1991).
Melnyk, A. 1994. Being a physicalist: How and (more importantly) why. *Philosophical Studies*, 74: 221-41.
Montero, B. 2009. What is the physical? In McLaughlin et al. 2009.
Papineau, D. 2001. The rise of physicalism. In C. Gillett and B. Loewer (eds.) *Physicalism and its Discontents*. New York: CUP, pp. 3-36.

Week 4 The Knowledge Argument

Jackson, F. 1982. Epiphenomenal qualia, *Philosophical Quarterly* 32: 127-136. Reprinted in Lycan & Prinz 2008 and Chalmers 2002.
Lewis, D. 2002. What experience teaches. Reprinted in Chalmers 2002 and O'Connor & Robb 2003.
Loar, B. 1997. Phenomenal states (second version). In Block et al. 1997. Reprinted in Chalmers 2002.
Ludlow, P., Y. Nagasawa, and D. Stoljar (eds.). 2004. Introduction. In *There's Something About Mary*, MIT Press.
Perry, J. 2001. *Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Week 5 Type Identity Theories

Enç, B. 1983. In defense of the identity theory. *Journal of Philosophy*, 80: 279-298.

- Hill, C. 1991. *Sensations: A Defence of the Identity Theory*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kim, J. 1992. Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 52: 1-26. Reprinted in Chalmers 2002.
- Kripke, S. 1980. Identity and necessity, extract from *Naming and Necessity*. Reprinted in O'Connor & Robb 2003 and Chalmers 2002.

Week 6 Type Identity Theories Cont.

- Lewis, D. 1994. Reduction of Mind. In Guttenplan, S. (ed.) *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford, Blackwell). Reprinted in O'Connor & Robb 2003.
- Place, U.T. 1956. Is consciousness a brain process? *British Journal of Psychology*, 47: 44-50. Reprinted in Chalmers (2002) and Lycan & Prinz 2008.
- Smart, J.J.C. 1962. Sensations and brain processes. In Chalmers (2002).
- Smart, J.J.C. 2004. The identity theory of the mind. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind_identity/

Week 7 Token Identity Theories

- Davidson, D. 1963. Actions, reasons, and causes, *Journal of Philosophy*, 60: 685-700. Reprinted in his *Essays on Actions and Events* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Davidson, D. 1970. Mental events. In L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (eds.), *Experience and Theory*, Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, pp. 79-101. Reprinted in *Reprinted in his Essays on Actions and Events* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Horgan, T. and Tye, M. 1985. Against the token identity theory, in E. LePore and B. McLaughlin (eds.) *Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson*, 408-427.
- Hornsby, J. 1980-1. Which physical events are mental events? *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 81: 73- 92. Reprinted in her (1997) *Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Week 8 Functionalism

- Armstrong, D. The causal theory of the mind. Reprinted in Chalmers 2002 and Lycan & Prinz 2008.
- Jackson, F., Pargetter, R. & Prior, E.W. 1982. Functionalism and type-type identity theories, *Philosophical Studies*, 42/2: 209-225.
- Shoemaker, S. 1975. Functionalism and qualia, *Philosophical Studies*, 27: 291-315. Reprinted in his *Identity, Cause and Mind: Philosophical Essays* (1984).
- Shoemaker, S. 1981. Some varieties of functionalism. *Philosophical Topics*, 12: 83-118. Reprinted in his *Identity, Cause and Mind: Philosophical Essays* (1984).
- Putnam, H. The nature of mental states. Reprinted in Lycan & Prinz 2008 and Chalmers 2002.

Week 9 Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Mind

- Husserl, E. 'Philosophy as Rigorous Science'.
- Week 10 Phenomenology Cont.*

Crowell, S. 'The First-Person Character of Philosophical Knowledge', in *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger* (Cambridge: 2013).
Gallagher S. and Zahavi, D. 'Methodologies', in *The Phenomenological Mind* (Routledge, 2012).

Week 11 *Phenomenology Cont.*

Gallagher S. and Zahavi, D. 'Intentionality', in *The Phenomenological Mind* (Routledge, 2012).
Gallagher S. and Zahavi, D. 'Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Science, and Phenomenology', in *The Phenomenological Mind* (Routledge, 2012).

Week 12 *Phenomenology Cont.*

Crowell, S. 'The Normative in Perception', in *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger* (Cambridge: 2013).
Crowell, S. 'Husserl's Subjectivism and the Philosophy of Mind', in *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger* (Cambridge: 2013).

Philosophy of Literature

Hope, Memory, Time, Death: Literature as “Examined Life”

Steven DeLay

Course Description

Why do we write works of fiction, and why do we enjoy reading them? What explains why reading and producing works of literature should be inextricably entwined with the very human condition to which they respond? What kind of change, intentional or otherwise, does writing a work of literature produce in the one who writes it, and how in turn does reading such a work change the one who reads it? If antiquity understood philosophy as the means by which one might hope to live ‘the examined life’, today it is perhaps literature more than anything else that still performs this venerable function. It is with the challenge of what it might even mean to live an examined life in mind that we will read some works of literature that each demonstrate, in various ways, how literature contributes to that undertaking. First, we will look at the role of hope in human life. How is the very act of writing sometimes itself an expression of hope, and how can reading such a text likewise sustain and inspire hope? Next, we will turn to the related function of memory. How does memory, both individual and collective, enable us to order what would otherwise remain a totally irretrievable past and unpredictable future into a meaningful present? And how does the act of writing function as a means of so doing? Finally, we will turn to death. How, by seriously facing up to mortality, can certain works of literature be understood as the attempt to prepare for the inevitable? This course will introduce students to literature’s ability to make thoughtful sense of the time that leads to death.

Texts

- Augustine. (2009) *The Confessions*. Translated by H. Chadwick. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Blanchot, Maurice. (2000) *The Instant of My Death*. Translated by A. Stoekl. Stanford University Press.
- Chrétien, Jean-Louis. (2002) *The Unforgettable and the Unhoped For*. Translated by J. Bloechl. New York, NY: Fordham University Press.
- Dostoevsky, Fyodor. (2008) ‘The Dream of a Ridiculous Man’. Translated by C. Garnett. Dodo Press.
- Ellison, Ralph. *Invisible Man*
- Fitzgerald, Scott F. *This Side of Paradise*
- Kimball, Michael. *Us*
- Plath, Sylvia. *The Bell Jar*
- Ricoeur, Paul. (1985) *Time and Narrative: Volume II*. Translated by K. McLaughlin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Robinson, Marilynne. *Home: A Novel*
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. (1977) *What is Literature?*. Translated by B. Frechtman. New York: Philosophical